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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Giovanni M. Mendiola appeals from the denial of his petition for postconviction relief.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
Mendiola and his gang (including three brothers, a brother-in-law, and
three others) were hired by Brendan Butler, a marijuana trafficker in Northern
Idaho and Eastern Washington, to rob and kill a rival drug trafficker. (R., vol. 11,
pp. 245-51.) Mendiola and his gang invaded the home of the rival, tied his and
his girlfriend's hands, and ransacked the place stealing eight pounds of
marijuana and between $20,000 and $40,000. (R., vol. II, pp. 251-53.) Brendan
Butler was dissatisfied because Mendiola failed to kill the rival, and Mendiola was
upset because he thought he should have been paid more. (R., vol. 11, pp. 25355.) Mendiola and his gang returned about four months later, ostensibly to finish
the job by killing the rival drug trafficker, but instead Mendiola killed Brendan
Butler and stole about 56 pounds of marijuana, and expressed anger that Butler
had not had any cash. (R., vol. II, pp. 255-61.) Mendiola and the others took
Butler's Cadillac back to Seattle, where they stayed in Mendiola's sisters'
basement. (R., vol. II, pp. 261-64.)
The state charged Mendiola with conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery,
two counts of kidnapping and conspiracy to commit murder in relation to the first
incident involving the trafficking competitor and conspiracy to commit robbery,
conspiracy to commit kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and first-degree

murder for the killing and robbing of Brendan Butler. (R., vol. II, pp. 264-66.)
Mendiola pled guilty to one count of second-degree murder pursuant to a plea
agreement. (R., vol. 11, p. 266.)
Mendiola filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief asserting that he
wished relief from his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. (R.,
vol. I, pp. 8-11.) The state answered the petition. (R., vol. I, pp. 12-14.) The
district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition on the grounds that
it was unsupported by admissible evidence. (R., vol. I, pp. 15-17.) After several
extensions of time (R., vol. I, pp. 18-48), Mendiola filed an amended petition (R.,
p. 49). In the amended petition Mendiola alleged that his plea was not freely and
voluntarily entered and that the trial court failed to establish that it was freely and
voluntarily entered (R., vol. I, pp. 50-53); that the trial court failed to establish a
factual basis for the plea when it was entered (R., vol. I, pp. 53-54); and that trial
counsel was ineffective because a defense investigator had informed the
prosecutor that the crime Mendiola committed was murder, not manslaughter,
that counsel failed to challenge the factual basis for the Alford plea, and failed to
present evidence at sentencing that Mendiola was actually guilty of only
manslaughter (R., vol. I, pp. 54-56).
The state answered the amended petition. (R., vol. I, pp. 97-98.) The
court denied cross motions for summary disposition and set the matter for a
hearing. (R., vol. I, pp. 101-12, 117-42, 149-56.) At the hearing Mendiola called
four witnesses and introduced one document (a "kite" by Mendiola) as an exhibit.
(Tr., pp. 2-3.) The state's response did not include any witnesses, but did include

_._,
.'
@
.:..
.,,

.i.*.:%,.

exhibits:

:

registers of action from Mendiola's and his co-defendants' criminal

cases, a written plea agreement, and an immunity agreement for Justin Miller, a
co-defendant. (Tr., pp. 2-3; p. 110, L. 15 - p. 113, L. 14.) In addition, the district
court took judicial notice, from the record in the underlying criminal case, of the
grand jury transcript, the transcript of the change of plea hearing, the transcript of
the sentencing hearing, and the state's trial brief. (Tr., p. 102, L. 24 - p. 110, L.
15.)
After the hearing the judge denied the petition. (R., vol. II, pp. 233-306.)
Mendiola filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., vol. II, pp. 307-10.)

ISSUES
Mendiola states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when denied [sic] Mr. Mendiola's
petition for post-conviction relief in light of the numerous erroneous
factual findings and legal errors that, cumulatively and individually,
demonstrate that the district court failed to properly adjudicate Mr.
Mendiola's post-conviction claims?
(Appellant's brief, p. 18.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Are Mendiola's claims that the trial court erred in taking his Alford plea of
guilty because it allegedly failed to establish on the record that the plea was
knowing, intelligent and voluntary and allegedly failed to establish at the time of
the plea an adequate factual basis for accepting the plea not proper claims in
post-conviction because they could have been raised in the criminal proceedings
or on appeal?
2.
Has Mendiola failed to show error in the district court's denial of his claims
that his plea was not voluntary or that his counsel provided ineffective assistance
in failing to challenge the factual basis for the plea?

3.
Has Mendiola failed to show error in the district court's denial of his claims
that counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence at sentencing?

ARGUMENT

I.
Mendiola's Claims That The Trial Court Erred In Takina His Alford Plea Of Guilty
Are Not Proper Claims In Post-Conviction Because Thev Could Have Been
Raised In The Criminal Proceedinas Or On Appeal
A.

Introduction
Some of the claims in Mendiola's amended petition for post-conviction

relief are direct claims of error by the trial court in the criminal proceedings.
Specifically, Mendiola claimed that the district court in the underlying criminal
case erred in taking his plea because "[alt the time the guilty plea was entered,
the trial court did not properly examine Petitioner to determine if the plea was in
fact freely and voluntarily entered" and because the trial court "did not make a
proper factual finding to support the entry of the Aiford plea." (R., vol. I, pp. 50,
53.) The district court rejected the state's argument that these claims were not
appropriately raised in post-conviction proceedings because they could have
been raised in the criminal proceedings or on appeal.' (R., vol. I, pp. 150-53; vol.
II, pp. 235-40.) Application of the law to the facts, as shown below, demonstrates
that these claims are statutorily barred. Because the district court reached the
correct conclusion but should have dismissed these claims as procedurally
barred, the state requests this Court to affirm on the correct basis.

Morris, 119 ldaho 448,450,

See State v.

807 P.2d 1286, 1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate

review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld if it is capable of being upheld on
any theory); State v. Murphy, 129 ldaho 861, 863, 934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App.

' The state also asserts that if these matters are reached on the merits that
Mendiola has failed to show error by the district court.

1997) (where district court's ruling is correct it may be upheld on alternative
basis).

B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court's application of law to the facts in post-conviction proceedings

is subject to free review. Roberts v. State, 132 ldaho 494, 496, 975 P.2d 782,
784 (1999).
C.

Mendiola's Claims Of Trial Court Error In Takinq His Guilty Plea Are Not
Proper Claims In Post-Conviction Proceedinas
The remedy available under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act

("UPCPA) "is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the
proceedings in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence or conviction."
I.C. § 19-4901(b). In addition, an "issue which could have been raised on direct
appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction
proceedings" except under very limited circumstances. I.C.

5

19-4901(b). The

plain language of these statutory provisions indicates that matters that could and
should have been addressed in the criminal case or on direct appeal are not
properly brought under the UPCPA. Where, as here, a petitioner asks for relief
based exclusively upon a transcript of proceedings in the district court and
presents no new or additional evidence, that petitioner is improperly trying to use
the UPCPA as a substitute for proceedings in the trial court or on appeal.

See

Hoffman v. State, 125 ldaho 188, 190-91, 868 P.2d 516, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1994)
(refusing to consider issues that should have been raised on direct appeal).

Review of the relevant cases shows that a challenge to a guilty plea based
upon matters outside the record of the underlying criminal proceedings is proper
in post-conviction proceedings, but that a post-conviction petitioner is not entitled
under the UPCPA to a mere review of the record of the proceedings in the
criminal case for error. In Nellsch v. State, 122 ldaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (Ct.
App. 1992). Nellsch had been sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 25
years for first-degree kidnapping, but the ldaho Court of Appeals found the
sentence illegal, concluding that the minimum sentence was indeterminate life.
Id. at 429, 835 P.2d at 664. After he had been re-sentenced to indeterminate life
he petitioned in post-conviction proceedings to withdraw his plea.

Id.

He

asserted two grounds for relief: first, that he was unaware that the crime he pled
guilty to required a minimum indeterminate life sentence and, second, that his
counsel had been ineffective when he entered his guilty plea.

at 430, 835

P.2d at 665. As to the first claim, the court agreed that it was proper to pursue in
post-conviction proceedings, but concluded that summary dismissal of the claim
was proper because, although the minimum term had not been explained on the
record at or before the guilty plea was accepted, it was known to Nellsch at the
resentencing, and therefore there was no manifest injustice in allowing the plea
to stand.

at 432, 835 P.2d at 667. Stated the Court:

Although it is true that Nellsch claimed he was unaware of the
minimum sentence at the time he entered his guilty plea, and that
he would not have entered the plea if he had been so informed, he
has failed to explain why he did not attempt to withdraw his plea
prior to the resentencing hearing or why he did not raise this issue
on direct appeal from resentencing. Under these circumstances,
any failure to inform the petitioner of the minimum term prior to
entry of the plea must be viewed as only a technical deficiency.

Id. Thus, although the court looked at the record of the underlying case, it did so
only to conclude that it disproved Nellsch's claim. It did not hold that Nellsch was
entitled to predicate a claim of error raised in post-conviction proceedings solely
upon the record of the underlying criminal case. Nellsch premised his claim on a
matter outside the record (his ignorance of the minimum sentence), which the
appellate court eventually deemed disproved by the record.
Likewise, in Ricca v. State, f24 ldaho 894, 865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App. 1993),
Ricca premised a challenge to his guilty plea on an allegation that the "plea was
involuntary because he was under the influence of medication at the time he
entered his plea."

Id. The ldaho Court of Appeals concluded such claim was not

barred because Ricca had failed to make a motion to withdraw the plea in the
criminal case.

Id.at 896-97, 865 P.2d at 987-88.

The court affirmed summary

dismissal, however, because Ricca failed to support his claim with any evidence
that the sleep aid he claimed he was taking would have had any effect on his
ability to enter a plea. E a t 897, 865 P.2d at 988.'

The district court cited several other cases in which the ldaho Court of Appeals
addressed post-conviction claims that guilty pleas were involuntary. (R., vol. 11,
p. 267.) None of these opinions directly addressed whether the claims would be
barred by I.C. § 19-4901(b) if the state had asserted it. Odom v. State, 121
ldaho 625,826 P.2d 1337 (Ct. App. 1992); Amerson v. State, 119 ldaho 994,812
P.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1991); Simons v. State, 116 ldaho 69, 71, 773 P.2d 1156,
1158 (Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing that the claim might have been barred by I.C.
§ 19-4901(b) but deciding to address claim on the merits without resolving this
issue); Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002, 1003 n.1, 712 P.2d 703, 704 n.1 (Ct.
App. 1985) (noting that it was unclear whether Fowler's claim would have been
barred as justiciable on appeal but declining to address the issue because the
state did not raise it); Schmidt v. State, 103 ldaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct. App.
1982).

Nellsch's and Ricca's claims should be compared with Mendiola's. Unlike
a claim based on what he actually believed at the time he entered his guilty plea,
such as made by Nellsch, Mendiola asserted that the district court erred by failing
to properly examine him. (R., vol. I, p. 50.) Unlike Ricca's claim that he was
under the influence of medication that prevented a voluntary plea, Mendiola
complains that the district court erred by failing to make sure an adequate factual
basis was presented before accepting his guilty plea. (R., vol. I, p. 53.) It is clear
from the nature of the claims that Mendiola has asserted that he is improperly
trying to use his post-conviction petition "as a method of appealing from a
judgment of conviction." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 237, 459 P.2d 1017,
1019 (1969).

A post-conviction petition is not a substitute for an appeal or other
remedies available in the original criminal proceedings. Mendiola's claims of
error by the trial court, based exclusively upon the transcript of the guilty plea
hearing, are appellate claims. They should have been dismissed because they
are barred by I.C. fj19-4901(b).

II.
Mendiola Has Failed To Show Error in The District Court's Denial Of His Claims
That His Plea Was,,Not Voluntarv Or That His Counsel Provided Ineffective
Assistance In Failing To Challenge The Factual Basis For The Plea
A.

Introduction
In his petition Mendiola did assert claims challenging his guilty plea that

were not based solely upon a reading of the underlying record. First, he claimed
that his plea was in fact coerced by threats to prosecute Mendiola's family

members. (R., vol. I, pp. 50-53.) Second, he claimed that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance for failing to challenge the factual basis for the Alford plea.
(R., voi. I, pp. 54-55.) Although these claims were properly brought to the trial
court, Mendiola has failed to show that denial of these claims was error.
B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claim is based.
I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430,436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark
v. State, 92 ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). Where the district court
conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and conclusions of law, an
appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous,
but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those
facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).
A trial court's decision that the petitioner has not met his or her burden of proof is
entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990); see also I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Mendiola argues that the district court abused its discretion by applying an
incorrect legal standard.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 28-35.)

Because the proper

standard of review is not abuse of discretion but is instead one of free review of
application of the law to the facts found, whether the district court correctly
articulated the applicable legal standard is irrelevant. Application of the law to
the facts found shows no error.

C.

Mendiola Failed To Prove That His Plea Was Coerced BV The
Prosecution's Promise To Decline Prosecution Of His Sisters If He Pled

Guiltv
"A plea of guilty is deemed coerced only where it is improperly induced by
ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho 530, 537.21 1 P.3d 775,
782 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Spry, 127 ldaho 107, 110, 897 P.2d 1002,
1005 (Ct. App. 1995)). A plea is involuntary if an innocent person would have felt
compelled to plead guilty in light of the circumstances. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho at
537, 21 1 P3d at 782. Where plea negotiations include state promises about not
prosecuting loved ones, such negotiations are not coercive in a constitutional
sense if the state acts in good faith.

Id.at 538, 21 1 P.3d at 783 (citing Mata v.

w,124 ldaho 588, 594-95, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-60 (Ct. App. 1993)).

The

prosecutor acts in good faith when the state declines to prosecute a family
member as part of a plea negotiation if that prosecution would have been
supported by probable cause. Hanslovan, 147 ldaho at 538 n.8, 21 1 P3d at 783
n.8;

m,1245 ldaho at 595,861 P.2d at 1260.
Mendiola presented no evidence of bad faith by the prosecution. At the

hearing Mendiola called John Adams, the attorney who had represented him in
the underlying criminal case. (Tr., p. 5, L. 22 - p. 6, L. 18.) He described plea
negotiations that included Mendiola and his brothers who were co-defendants.
(Tr., p. 6, L. 19 - p. 8, L. 15.) (Mendiola does not assert on appeal that the
prosecution against the brothers was not supported by probable cause.)

In

addition, the plea negotiations included discussions that Mendiola's sisters might
also be charged. (Tr., p. 8, L. 16 - p. 9, L. 1.) Ultimately Mendiola entered an

Alford plea agreement whereby he would plead guilty to a reduced charge of
second-degree murder, the other charges in the indictment would be dismissed,
the state would recommend a sentence of life with twelve and one-half years
fixed, his co-defendants would receive recommendations for riders on reduced
charges of being accessories, and the sisters would not be prosecuted. (Tr., p.
10, L. 18 - p. 11, L. 15.) Although there was evidence that Mendiola pled guilty,
in part, on reliance on a promise that his sisters would not be prosecuted

(see

Tr.,p.11,L.16-p.12,L.8;p.86,L.21-p.89,L.2;p.94,L.21-p.95,L.6),
he presented no evidence that the state negotiated that promise in bad faith
because such a prosecution would have been without probable cause.
Mendiola concedes that there is no evidence in the record that charges
against his sisters would not have been supported by probable cause, and were
therefore made part of the negotiations in bad faith. (Appellant's brief, p. 33 ("the
record fails to provide any confirmation, in any way, that the prosecution of Mr.
Mendiola's sisters for some unidentified charge could be supported by probable
cause").) He argues, however, that it would "defy reason" to make him bear the
burden of proving that his plea was involuntary. (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34.)
He cites no authority that the state had the burden to disprove his post-conviction
claims (Appellant's brief, pp. 33-34); to the contrary, it is well-established that
Mendiola, as a post-conviction petitioner, bore the burden of proving his claims
by a preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430,
438, 725 P.2d 135, 143 (1986); Mata v. State, 124 ldaho 588, 591, 861 P.2d
1253, 1256 (Ct. App. 1993) (cited in Appellant's brief, pp. 36-38, for other

propositions but ignored on the burden of proof argument). Because Mendiola
by his own admission failed to present any evidence on an element of his claim
that his plea was coerced, he has failed to show that the district court erred in
denying him re~ief.~

D.

Mendiola Failed To Establish That The Court Erred Or That His Attorney
Was Deficient In Relation To Establishins A Factual Basis For The Plea
An Alford plea may not be withdrawn based upon a claim of actual

innocence "in cases where there is some basis in the record of factual guilt."
State v. Dopp, 124 ldaho 481, 486, 861 P.2d 51, 56 (1993) (emphasis added).
"In determining whether a factual basis for a guilty plea exists, we look to the
entire record before the frial judge at the time the plea was accepted." State v.
Ramirez, 122 ldaho 830, 824, 839 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis
added). Thus, it is proper for a court to look at the transcript of a probable cause
hearing for the factual basis of a guilty plea. Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002,
f005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985) (relying on preliminary hearing
transcript and PSI for factual basis for plea where defendant denied intent after
entering plea). As noted above, any aspect of Mendiola's claim that may be
resolved merely upon the record of the underlying criminal case is not a proper

The district court also found that the plea was not coerced because Mendiola
had failed to prove that the actual reason he entered the plea was to protect his
family, rather than to gain significant advantage for himself. (R., vol. II, pp. 26678.) Mendiola's argument on appeal that the court's factual findings in this
regard are clearly erroneous because he presented evidence he believes is
credible to support his claim (Appellant's brief, pp. 24-28) is specious. State v.
Pern/,139 ldaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 1235 (2003) (credibility determinations
are exclusive province of trial court); Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276-77,
971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998) (factual finding disturbed only if clearly erroneous).

claim under the UPCPA. Thus, the state will address this claim only in the
context that it was raised as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
To show that counsel was ineffective a petitioner must prove both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668,
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 ldaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 ldaho 631,634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 ldaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have
been different. Araaon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d I174, 1177
(1988); Cowaer v. State, 132 ldaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999).
A claim that counsel should have made a particular motion is properly rejected
on both prongs of this test if the motion would have been denied by the trial
court. Sanchez v. State, 127 ldaho 709,713, 905 P.2d 642,646 (Ct. App. 1995).
Mendiola failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to bring
a motion to withdraw the guilty plea on the ground of lack of factual basis
because such a motion would have been denied. At the guilty plea hearing the
trial court inquired of the parties about the factual basis for the plea and both
parties referred the court to the transcript of the grand jury proceedings. (R., p.
299 (citing Change of Plea Tr., p. 17, Ls. 14-22).) As found by the district court,

the transcript of the grand jury proceedings, in the record of the underlying
criminal case, provided a more-than-sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea.
(R., vol. 11, pp. 245-64, 282-83, 297-99, 302-03.)

Because the grand jury

transcript provides a factual basis for the plea and the transcript was in the
record before the court, any motion challenging the factual basis for the plea
would have failed. Dopp, 124 ldaho at 486, 861 P.2d at 56; Ramirez, 122 ldaho
at 824,839 P.2d at 1248.
Mendiola does not argue that the court was not referred to the grand jury
transcript or that the grand jury transcript fails to provide a factual basis for the
plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-28.) Mendiola instead contends that because his
counsel limited his stipulation, stipulating only that the grand jury transcript
provided "probable cause," that the lack of a stipulation to the factual basis
somehow invalidates the guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 22-23.) Mendiola
cites no authority for the proposition that a finding of a factual basis for a plea
may only be found upon the blessing of the defendant's attorney.

On the

contrary, the authority cited by Mendiola (Appellant's brief, p. 23) states that a
factual basis will be gleaned from "the entire record before the trial judge at the
time the plea was accepted." Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 824, 839 P.2d at 1248.
Because the grand jury transcript was in the record before the trial judge, and
was referenced by both parties as the factual basis for the plea, any challenge to
the factual basis grounded upon any limitation in defense counsel's stipulation
would have failed.

Mendiola next argues that the trial judge had not read the grand jury
transcript before accepting his plea.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 23-24.)

Again,

Mendiola cites no legal authority indicating this fact, even if true, would be a
relevant basis for a motion to withdraw the plea, much less that Mendiola would
have prevailed on such a motion.

Ramirez, 122 ldaho at 824, 839 P.2d at

1248. ("In determining whether a factual basis for a guilty plea exists, we look to
the entire record before the trial judge at the time the plea was accepted."). In
Fowler v. State, 109 ldaho 1002, 1005, 712 P.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1985), the
ldaho Court of Appeals stated that it was proper to rely on a PSI - clearly not a
document made part of the record before the plea was accepted - to, at least in
part, establish the factual basis for the plea.
Because Mendiola has supported his appellate arguments with no
relevant authority, his claim necessarily fails. I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952
P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998). Application of the correct legal standard, which
requires review of the entire record before the trial judge, shows that the grand
jury transcript provided more than an adequate factual basis for the guilty plea.

Ill.
Mendiola Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Claims
That Counsel Was Ineffective In Failing To Present Evidence At Sentencing
Mendiola alleged that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present the
testimony of Marco Garcia, an autopsy report, a toxicology report, and
unspecified general knowledge that the victim carried a gun, as evidence at
sentencing to show that Mendiola was really guilty of manslaughter, not the

murder to which he pled guilty. (R., vol. I, pp. 55-56.) The district court rejected
the claim, at least in part, because Mendiola never presented to the court the
evidence he believed his counsel deficiently failed to present. (R., vol. II, pp.
304-05.~)
Mendiola had the burden of proving his claims by a preponderance of
evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141
(1986); Clark v. State, 92 ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969). The claim he
had to prove was that his counsel's performance was deficient (that failure to
present the evidence was because of an objective shortcoming) and that he was
prejudiced by that deficiency (a reasonable probability that the sentencing would
have come out differently).

See Giles v. State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d

365, 368 (1994); Araqon v. State, 114 ldaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177
(1988).

The district court properly concluded that by failing to submit the

evidence counsel supposedly was ineffective in not presenting in sentencing,
Mendiola had not proved his claim.
On appeal Mendiola fails to explain how the court could have ruled in his
favor without seeing the evidence in question. (Appellant's brief, pp. 40-44.)
Mendiola's assumption that evidence he never presented would have established
facts he claims exist does not meet his burden of proving those facts. Without
reviewing the evidence it is impossible to ascertain if counsel's performance in
not submitting it to the court was objectively unreasonable.

Likewise, what

The trial court did reference an affidavit of Marco Garcia that was submitted with
the petition but never presented as evidence. (R., vol. II, pp. 304-05.)
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prejudice flowed from not having this evidence in sentencing is pure speculation.
In short, there was simply no proof. Mendiola has failed to show any error in the
district court's conclusion that in the complete absence of evidence Mendiola had
not met his burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying post-conviction relief.
DATED this 5'h day of March 2010.

A

Deputy Attorney ~enkral'
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of March 2010, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate P
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

